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ABSTRACT
In this thesis, I argue that many identification intuitions, such as one that helps you
identify the authorship of a painting you are seeing for the first time, fall under the class of
experience-based intuitions. Such identification intuitions cannot arise without intuition
generating systems (IGSs) that are shaped by experiences accumulated during one’s life. On my
view, experience-based intuitions are produced by domain-general learning systems of
hierarchical abstraction which may be modeled by deep convolutional neural networks. Owing to
the mechanism of such IGSs, the reliability of experience-based intuition X depends on the
quality of the experiences underlying the IGS which produces X. Lastly, I suggest that insofar as
some philosophical thought experiments elicit experience-based identification intuitions, we can
use the case method to glean information about our experiences as well as uncover certain
conceptual commitments.
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1

INTRODUCTION

It seems to me that existing philosophical theories cannot adequately account for a broad
subset of intuitions. To get a sense of the sort of intuitions I have in mind, imagine the following
scenario. You are visiting a new art museum for the first time. While you have some familiarity
with canonical works of major artists, you are no art historian. Upon entering the first gallery of
the museum, one painting catches your eye. The subject of the painting – a single tree – is
portrayed with bold brushstrokes and vibrant blues and yellows. Although this painting is neither
prominently displayed nor surrounded by museum visitors, you get a sudden sense that it is a van
Gogh. But you can’t quite articulate why. You’ve never seen this painting before, so you are not
merely recalling its image from memory. You have seen reproductions of Starry Night,
Sunflowers and a few of van Gogh’s self-portraits, but those paintings look very different from
the painting in front of you. Even more puzzlingly, many other landscapes hanging in the same
gallery – the Impressionist wing of the museum – seem similar in style to the painting that
caught your eye. When asked how you know the painting is a van Gogh, you might point out its
bold colors or abstract manner of depiction. But a dozen other paintings in the gallery can be
described in the same way. Nevertheless, your hunch turns out to be right! A label confirms that
the painting is The Mulberry Tree (1889) by Vincent van Gogh.

2

Figure 1.1 The Mulberry Tree, Vincent van Gogh (c. October 1889)
Norton Simon Art Foundation

Your spontaneous and surprisingly accurate identification of the painting is prompted, I
suggest, by an experience-based intuition.
A survey of literatures outside of philosophy reveals a consensus on people’s reliance on
similar sorts of identification intuitions across a panoply of domains of experience, including
chess, sports, medicine, and military operations.1 For instance, a seasoned trauma nurse making
quick triage decisions relies not on referencing medical textbooks but on looking at patients. Yet
existing philosophical accounts do not explain such identification intuitions very well. There
seem to be two major camps of philosophical accounts of intuition. Rationalist accounts
generally posit that intuitions are direct and a priori apprehension or insight (Bealer 1998,
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See Cokely and Feltz (2014) for an overview.
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Bengson 2015, BonJour 1998). In contrast, a second type of account claims that intuitions
largely result from systems which evolved to solve common problems in our evolutionary
environment (Bargh 2011, Gigerenzer 2007, Klein 1998). Conceiving of intuitions as the outputs
of evolved systems may be helpful for demonstrating how intuitions can be calibrated to a
limited extent (Nagel 2012). However, as I discuss in more detail in section two, neither
rationalist nor evolved systems accounts are particularly well-suited to explain the identification
intuition in cases like the van Gogh example, which is made possible, not merely improved, by
first-person experience. Moreover, thinking of intuitions as not rooted in experience has also
effected a trend toward doubting their evidentiary role in judgment-making. Peter Railton is one
of few contemporary philosophers optimistic about the reliability of intuitions, perhaps owing in
part to his emphasis on the role of experience in shaping intuitions diachronically. For Railton,
that intuitions are “direct, immediate, non-analytic” is just a user illusion – probabilistic
computations are hard at work behind the scenes (2016: 38). But his account focuses on how
representations of probability are updated through experience, not on how we come to have
intuitions based on representations of concepts in the first place.2 Thus, to better explain the sorts
of identification intuitions that interest me, it seems that a radically empiricist account of
intuition is in order.
The term intuition is used in many ways in philosophical literature. Here I will use the
term intuition to refer to the conscious mental state that is a token of any given intuition type. For
instance, one may experience many instances of moral intuitions, of possibility intuitions, or of
art identification intuitions. Intuition generating system (IGS) refers to the cognitive structures
that generate intuitions. IGS-shaping experiences are those experiences that shape an IGS by

2

Railton has also tended to focus on normative intuitions, especially moral intuitions.
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enriching it with content and refining its structure prior to the moment of intuiting. Lastly,
intuition-prompting experience refers to any token experience that jumpstarts the process to
engender a token intuition in real time. To clarify, there is a widespread consensus that intuitions
are prompted by experience. What I take issue with is the extent to which experience
accumulated prior to the moment of intuiting makes certain intuitions possible. In the art
identification scenario, then, prior encounters with artworks are the IGS shaping experiences that
have cultivated in you a relatively robust IGS with content pertaining to artworks. Seeing the
painting is the intuition-prompting experience. That you possess such an IGS makes it possible
for you to have an art identification intuition at the museum that turns out to be accurate.
In this thesis, I argue for the following two theses:
Thesis 1: There exists a class of intuitions which cannot arise without experiencedependent intuition generating systems (IGSs) that are influenced by IGS-shaping
experiences encountered during one’s life. I call these experience-based intuitions.3
Thesis 2: The reliability of an experience-based intuition X depends on the
quality of the IGS-shaping experiences underlying the IGS which produces X.4

The plan is as follows. In section one, I outline five features of intuition. In section two, I
argue that the conscious mental state which prompts your identification of the van Gogh painting
is an experience-based intuition. The first two sections constitute my defense of Thesis 1. In
section three, I argue that experience-dependent IGSs are structures which perform hierarchical
abstraction from experiential data. I briefly consider a computational model for such IGSs. In
section four, I argue that the structure of these IGSs explains the varying degrees of reliability of
experience-based intuitions and address some skeptical challenges. I also suggest that even if

3

The existence claim in Thesis 1 does not preclude the possibility that some IGSs are a priori or shaped primarily
by evolutionary forces.
4
Joshua Greene (2017) has suggested that the acquisition of good moral intuitions require representative data and
value-aligned training, which appears to agree with Thesis 2.
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intuitions cannot always guide us rightly, identification intuitions rooted in experience may be a
necessary component of many judgments. In the last section, I address some implications of my
account to philosophical methodology. In particular, I suggest that some philosophical thought
experiments produce experience-based intuitions of the same sort as those prompted in everyday
situations. I end by suggesting that even if these thought experiment intuitions do not reveal a
priori truths, they could uncover veiled conceptual commitments and tell us about the
experiences that underpin our intuitive judgments.

6

2

FEATURES OF INTUITION

Some theorists have noted that the kind intuition is heterogeneous. Jennifer Nado (2014), for
instance, points out that intuitions across domains have diverse etiologies and content. Even so,
there remains some consensus about features that a mental state should have in order to be called
an intuition. Here I enumerate five commonly accepted features of intuition.
There is a consensus that intuitions:
(1) Are conscious
Intuitions are experienced consciously – it feels a certain way to have an intuition. The
terms many philosophers use to describe having an intuition unveil a shared assumption that
intuitions possess a subjective quality of experience. George Bealer (1998), for instance,
describes an intuition as a “conscious episode” (208). Railton (2014) describes the experience of
intuiting as finding “ourselves with a spontaneous ‘sense’ (815). And, as Panaccio (2014) puts it,
an intuition “is itself a distinct reality within the mind” (65).
(2) Are induced by sensory or imagined input
Intuitions are most often triggered by an experience, as when a trial attorney gets the
sense from the expressions of jurors that her argument fails to convince (Railton 2014: 818).
Figments of our own imagination can also prompt intuitions.5
(3) Are induced non-voluntarily
We may choose to engage in activities that end up giving rise to an intuition, but having
this choice does not grant us control over the resulting intuition. When we describe an intuition
as being triggered by an experience, we mean that the intuition happens to us. For instance,
though consciously entertaining a thought experiment may trigger an intuition, that intuition is

5

Chandra Sripada (2016) suggests that future-oriented affects and intuitions can result from imagined scenarios.
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not formed spontaneously or in a way we can control (Gopnik & Schwitzgebel 1998).
Spontaneity also doesn’t imply habitual recalling of information learned by rote (Ohlsson 2011).
(4) Are produced by processes that are introspectively opaque to the intuitor
Though intuitions are consciously experienced, how we come to experience them is
opaque to us (Kornblith 2002). When we attempt to explain how we have arrived at an intuition,
we might come up with something that sounds convincing. But such explanations amount to post
hoc justifications, since we lack direct access to the processes generating our intuitions. This
inaccessibility can be especially glaring in cases where our explanations fail to support the
intuitions in question. We might even be surprised by our intuitions because we have little grasp
on how they come about.
(5) Are disposed to guide deliberation, judgment and/or action
Theories of intuition abound because there is a shared assumption that intuitions do guide
actions to varying degrees, regardless of whether we think they should.6 Many think intuitions
amount to judgments, while others, including myself, disagree.7 Either way, intuitions have a
strong disposition to guide further reasoning and action. However, intuitions can at times be
recalcitrant in the face of contrary evidence or conscious reasoning, leading to judgments that
may conflict with other attitudes held by the intuitor.
In sum, intuitions generally (1) are conscious, (2) are induced non-voluntarily, (3) are
induced by sensory or imagined input, (4) are produced by processes that are introspectively
opaque, and (5) are disposed to guide deliberation and action. But does intuition really play a

6

Some have suggested that philosophers, for instance, may not crucially rely on intuitions when philosophizing
(Cappelan 2012, Deutsch 2010, Ichikawa 2014, Williamson 2007).
7
To proceed from having an intuition to having a propositionally articulated judgment, interpretation in light of
existing beliefs may be an intermediary step (McGahhey & Van Leeuwen, 2018). Intuitions may thus be necessary
though insufficient conditions for some judgments.
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role in helping you identify a van Gogh painting?

9

3

EXPERIENCE-BASED INTUITIONS

The experience that you have in response to the van Gogh painting is an intuition in the
relevant sense, since it has all five features of intuition outlined above.
(Feature 1) You are suddenly overcome with a conscious, if murky, sense of familiarity
when you encounter the painting.8 It just seems to you like a van Gogh.
(Feature 2) This sudden sense is prompted by the perceptual input you receive from your
viewing experience.
(Feature 3) Although a series of deliberate actions – such as those involved in planning a
museum visit – make your encounter with the painting possible, a sense about the painting’s
authorship comes to you spontaneously. You need not have the explicit goal of identifying any
artwork to in fact identify the van Gogh painting. Further, no effortful reasoning is employed in
the moment of intuiting. You simply don’t compare the artwork you are viewing, feature by
feature, against a repertoire of potential matches recalled from memory.
(Feature 4) The processes leading to the identification are opaque to you. You just get the
sense that you’re looking at a van Gogh without being able to explain how you came to that
insight. When asked to justify the identification, you might appeal to certain visual features of
the painting. But each explanation you articulate fails to sufficiently support the identification,
since you would describe many other paintings in the museum in the same ways.
(Feature 5) Lastly, this hazy sense, rather than other forms of reasoning, is what leads
you to identify the painting. Moreover, even if a well-informed fellow visitor claims that the
museum houses no artworks by van Gogh, your sense might persist.
As we have seen, all five features obtain for the art identification intuition. Thus, the

8

Though I focus my discussion on the identification component of the van Gogh encounter, other phenomenological
content is also likely present, such as vague like or dislike of the painting.
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general conception of intuitions as a mental state should include similar identification intuitions.
And since intuitions of identification co-exist amongst other intuitions under the same
psychological class, they are of comparable theoretical interest.
A thread unifying many intuitions across divergent areas of expertise is that prior
experience is necessary for generating such intuitions. For the sake of clarity, in this paper I
focus on the identification of artistic style as a case study. But similar identification intuitions
seem to be relevant in medicine (Cork et al. 2014, Hogarth 2001, Elstein et al. 1990), chicken
sexing (Horsey 2002), chess (de Groot 1965 and 1996, Chase & Simon 1973), business (Provis
2010) and military operations (Banks & Dhami 2014). Just as a chess novice is guided less by an
intuitive grasp of board positions than by consciously recalling rules of the game, someone who
is unfamiliar with any work by van Gogh simply cannot have the intuition you had at the
museum.9 Such identification intuitions are marked by a crucial and distinguishing characteristic
– they cannot be a priori. Thus, rationalist accounts fail to explain at least some intuitions.
Further, the cognitive mechanism underlying art identification intuitions would be
mischaracterized as evolved systems. Here one might object to my claim by suggesting that such
an intuition could be the byproduct of an evolved cognitive system responsible for identification
of novel objects in the environment, which system had aided our ancestors in the detection of
potential threats. To be sure, evolved systems may help to explain all intuitions to a limited
extent. After all, our visual apparatus – a system necessary for visually identifying an artwork –
has itself been shaped by evolutionary forces. However, an evolved system within the context of
intuition production is usually characterized by domain specificity,10 ontogenetic stability, and
minimal reliance on and improvement by training. Consider intuitions about biological kinds,

9

Such a person would also be hard-pressed to identify a van Gogh through non-intuitive means.
Though there are dissenters – see Barrett and Kurzban (2006).
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which in part help us understand that animals within a species share certain features. Intuitive
biological thinking bears the mark of being the product of an evolved system of intuition
generation. It applies specifically to intuitions about species. More importantly, essentialist
biological thinking persists at least from adolescence into early adulthood and is influenced
minimally by biology education (Coley et al. 2017). Not only are we endowed with rigid
“templates” for biological kinds (Boyer 2001), these templates, even in cases where they become
unhelpful, remain largely unsusceptible to revision. In contrast, art identification intuitions only
appear to be domain specific insofar as they pertain to one area of experience, but the
mechanisms underlying visual identification applies across the board to all images. Identification
intuitions also depend on experience rather than on ontogenetic development. That is, when it
comes to artistic style, the accumulation of art viewing experiences, rather than developmental
stage, is what determines the possibility of having an intuition. The same holds true for
recognizing board positions in chess, for triaging trauma patients, and for identifying the
composer of a piece of music you’re hearing for the first time. Moreover, even if it is possible to
construct templates helpful for artistic style identification – e.g., blue and yellow swirls =
Vincent van Gogh – those very templates must be devised by individuals who are familiar with
works by van Gogh and other artists. Therefore, the van Gogh intuition, and others like it, are not
adequately explained by evolved systems accounts of intuition.
To be sure, not all expert intuitions are experience-based intuitions. While a trauma
nurse’s triage decisions are experience-based intuitions of identification, not all medical
decisions qualify as such intuitions. For instance, a physician may come, through repeated
practice, to perform biopsies in a way that appears second nature. Robert McCauley (2011)
suggests that practiced naturalness may arise from extensive practice and may explain some
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expert intuitions. On my account, practiced naturalness is distinct from experience-based
intuitions, since, according to McCauley, effortful practice is essential in the acquisition of
practiced naturalness. While effortful practice such as reading a medical textbook is sometimes
part of the prior experience enabling one to have an experience-based intuition, such as might be
the case in the triage nurse example, it is certainly not necessary. After all, the process by which
we come to be able to intuitively tell chairs apart from non-chairs involves little to no conscious
effort or instruction. Further, McCauley’s account of practiced naturalness also focuses on
learned physical skills such as swinging a golf club, rather than on intuitions which enable
conscious decisions. To illustrate the difference, consider the sort of practice that world-class
soccer players go through versus the sort of experience that could allow someone to identify that
a pass was successful or not. Consider also the differences between being a comedian who excels
at comedic timing and being able to identify good comedic timing. In each case, the latter ability
requires prior familiarity, while the former ability constitutes a skill requiring extensive practice.
In sum, cases such as the van Gogh example involve an identification intuition made
possible by relevant prior experience. By definition, intuitions are produced by intuition
generating systems. Specifically, an IGS responsible for producing an intuition such as an art
identification intuition (1) is not the product of any specific evolutionary pressure and (2)
requires extensive experience, rendering it different in kind from some other IGSs. Thesis 1 has
thus been established. Next I turn to the structure of experience-dependent IGSs.
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4

EXPERIENCE-DEPENDENT INTUITION GENERATING SYSTEMS

Everything which we observe imprints itself uncomprehended and unanalyzed on our
percepts and ideas, which then, in their turn, mimic the process of nature in their most
general and striking features. In these accumulated experiences, we possess a treasure-store,
which is ever close at hand, and of which only the smallest portion is embodied in clear
articulate thought. (Mach 1883/1960: 36)
In the passage, Ernst Mach suggests that we obtain much unthematized or unanalyzed
information from the environment. Of that information, a small portion is encoded into
articulable knowledge while a larger portion is organized non-theoretically into “percepts and
ideas” not subject to conscious control. The resulting percepts and ideas in turn help us process
information and navigate through the environment. Following Mach,11 I suggest that mental
categories derived from experience inform identification intuitions. To imbue my account of
experience-based intuitions with theoretical richness, in this section, I argue that: (1) IGSs
responsible for producing identification intuitions operate by generating abstract categories from
experience, (2) deep convolutional neural networks (DCNNs) provide a helpful and biologically
plausible model for experience-dependent IGSs, and (3) all five features of intuition are wellexplained by such a model.
4.1

Three characteristics of experience-dependent IGSs
To begin, an IGS capable of producing experience-based intuitions of identification

should have three characteristics. First, as I have argued in section two, it should be a generalpurpose mechanism that is highly receptive to training through experience (general-purpose).
Second, it can generate representations of categories by grouping similar objects through
detecting irrelevant information. This process of abstraction should be hierarchical, such that
increasingly fine-grained categories can be formed from one sufficiently large repertoire of

11

According to Panaccio (2014), Ockham has a similar account of concept acquisition which posits the human mind
as being endowed with a mechanism for generating representations from exemplars.
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experience (hierarchical category grouping). An example of categories ranked from most to
least general might be: artifacts, artworks, paintings, Impressionist paintings, paintings by van
Gogh. Relatedly, the intricacy of hierarchical categories represented by an IGS is positively
correlated with the amount of experience that has gone into shaping it. Third, an experiencedependent IGS should have the flexibility to use one experience to inform multiple categories,
not just within one hierarchical lineage (cross-category abstraction). For instance, seeing the
Mulberry Tree might modify artistic style categories in addition to other categories such as tree.
4.2

Value of a computational model
Judging from these three characteristics of experience-dependent IGSs, deep

convolutional neural networks (DCNNs) seem to have the potential to be a helpful model. Before
delving into their mechanism, I want to briefly discuss the virtues of using (primarily) a
computational model to explain a human cognitive structure. First, artificial neural networks are
often modeled on mammalian neural networks. While artificial neural networks solve machine
learning problems, they are nonetheless biologically realistic models. Second, when it comes to
visual perception, there is evidence suggesting that the 6-layer “deep” structure of the
mammalian neocortex and the hierarchical processing in the ventral stream have analogues in
artificial neural networks like the DCNN.12 From these similarities, Cameron Buckner (2018) has
recently argued that DCNNs model core aspects of abstraction – what I argue to be a key
capacity of experience-dependent IGSs – in the mammalian brain. Third, the strategy of using
computational models to explain human abilities has a demonstrable lineage. For example,
O’Loughlin and Thagard (2000) use a connectionist model to enrich and test Uta Frith’s (1989)
weak central coherence theory of autism. Chandra Sripada (2016) proposes a deep learning

12

Buckner 2018. See also Khaligh-Razavi & Kriegeskorte 2014, Yamins & DiCarlo 2016.

15

account of the role of mind-wandering in prospection. Bayesian models of a plethora of human
capacities also abound.13 Lastly, one might object that AI researchers are sometimes at a loss as
to how artificial networks that they themselves created are able to produce certain results,
suggesting that philosophers are ill-advised to look to AI for answers about intuition production.
However, there is a rich body of machine learning literature on how artificial neural networks
operate, what sorts of tasks they can perform, how their performance can be improved, etc. Not
to mention, a computational model offers exciting opportunities for testing hypotheses, since
artificial networks are more easily manipulated than are human subjects. Thus, even
acknowledging the possibility that DCNNs might later turn out to be an imperfect model for
experience-dependent IGSs, using such a model is still valuable at present.
4.3

How DCNNs explain experience-dependent IGSs
In contrast to other types of artificial neural networks, DCNNs are “deep” because they

have multiple intermediate layers between input and output layers. According to Buckner (2018),
convolutional filters pass outputs up the processing hierarchy by detecting and amplifying the
presence of desired features and minimizing other information (19-20). At present, DCNNs
primarily perform recognition tasks. Impressive practical applications for DCNNs include
detection of tumors in scans and natural language processing. Here I focus on how they perform
in detecting and naming visual content, since such tasks are most comparable to the van Gogh
example.
DCNNs possess the three characteristics of experience-dependent IGSs, since they are
general-purpose learning mechanisms that perform hierarchical category grouping and crosscategory abstraction. First, DCNNs are general-purpose systems that are highly responsive to
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training. Even the most intricately-designed algorithm cannot produce accurate results if it lacks
sufficient training input. DCNNs are also general-purpose in that an algorithm equipped to
process images can process images of any kind. Moreover, DCNNs can be trained without
supervision. Human IGSs are not solely shaped by labeled information – a minority of the
information gleaned through the environment is labeled, mostly during our formative years and
in formal education. A DCNN can similarly learn from unlabeled datasets without explicit
instructions (Silver et al. 2017).14 In short, not only are DCNNs trained by experience, they are
trained in ways that are analogous to how experience-dependent IGSs are trained.
Second, DCNNs are unique amongst artificial neural networks in their ability to perform
hierarchical abstractions. The presence of nuisance variables, including size, position, and
angular rotation in visual identification tasks has long stumped rule-based algorithms. For
instance, a chair viewed from the bottom can appear vastly different from the same chair viewed
from the front, even after controlling for size and proportion. Low-level visual features of images
can exhibit such variety to render it impossible to compose a rule comprehensive enough to
capture all images of chairs. But DCNNs are not rule-based, direct input-output systems. They
are multi-layered systems that perform abstractions. DCNNs are remarkably adept at
accentuating task-relevant features while controlling for nuisance variation (Patel et al. 2015). At
each convolutional layer, idiosyncratic presentations of images, such as lines at different
positions, sizes, or orientation get filtered out to produce more abstract presentations that are fed
to the next layer (Buckner 2018: 23). Moreover, DCNNs’ performance of hierarchical category
grouping from exemplars has an analogue in human memory consolidation and learning.

Promising new developments in AI combine reinforcement learning with an “episodic buffer” that replays
sessions in “offline training,” simulating memory consolidation during sleep and daydreams in mammals. See also
Blundell et al., 2016; Hassabis et al., 2017; Kumaran, Hassabis, & McClelland 2016; Mnih et al., 2015.
14
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According to an influential account of complementary learning systems by McClelland et al.
(1995), hippocampal synaptic changes associated with new memories trigger changes in the
neocortical system responsible for the consolidation and continued revision of remote memories,
suggesting that one process of learning from experience involves extracting underlying
commonalities from accumulated episodic memories.
Turning now to the third feature of experience-dependent IGSs, DCNNs need to have the
ability to generate across categories from a given selection of data. The intuition that interests me
in the van Gogh example is not one that tells you the painting depicts a tree, or one that alerts
you to the fact that you’re looking at a painting. Rather, the intuition in question concerns the
style of the painting. But DCNNs are tested primarily on identification of images of everyday
objects such as chairs. To be successful at such a task, an algorithm needs to treat style of
depiction as a nuisance factor. Can a DCNN trained on a selection of paintings generate
categories based on style in addition to identifying the objects depicted? As it turns out, they can.
In fact, modelers of DeepArt15 rely on the ability for an algorithm to extract input images’ style
to render any image uploaded by users in the style of famous artists.
There are a couple of ways to account for this capability, both of which lend further
support to using DCNNs to model experience-dependent IGSs. The first way is through
considering task relevance. With respect to any perceptual inference task, the target to be
identified is distinguished from nuisance factors according to the goal. For a museum visitor, the
frame in which a painting is displayed and the color of the wall surrounding the painting are
appropriately considered nuisance. But if the task is to distinguish a framed painting from an
unframed one, then the frame itself is relevant. What a DCNN takes to be nuisance is similarly

15
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task relevant. Second and more intriguingly, one can also appeal to Buckner’s notion of
transformational abstraction. In short, DCNNs must generate information about the nuisance
that has been subtracted from exemplars when performing abstractions. An algorithm trained on
paintings featuring chairs does not only generalize about the category chair but also artistic
styles, since an input image’s style needs to be well-detected by the algorithm or it cannot be
filtered out.16 How DCNNs perform abstractions across categories without explicit direction to
do so mirrors how we sometimes extract information from the environment.
Finally, though I’ve focused my discussion of DCNNs on visual categorization tasks,
they may perform similarly in the generation of many other types of categories.17 Insofar as I
take experience-based intuitions to encompass far more than the identification of images, the
possibility that artificial systems like DCNNs can generate non-perceptual abstractions is another
point in their favor as a helpful model.
4.4

Five features of intuition revisited
As I have shown, DCNNs provide a biologically plausible model for experience-

dependent IGSs. They are general-purpose systems of hierarchical abstraction that can create
multiple categories from a given set of data. Let’s return to the five features of intuition in the
van Gogh case study to see how an experience-based identification intuition could be produced
by such a system. First, your intuition is triggered by viewing the painting. Your past knowledge
of art has contributed to shaping the IGS that produced this token intuition you are experiencing
in the gallery. Second, viewing the painting constituted the right sort of intuition-prompting
experience such that the corresponding IGS is triggered and spits out an intuition. Third, you
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Evidence suggests that AlphaGo (an algorithm that has defeated expert Go players at a notoriously complex
game) performs transformations beyond visual modalities, encompassing abstract notions including “influence,”
“connection,” and “stability” which are cited by human players as key notions of the game (Buckner 2018: 28).
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don’t have much if any control over how the intuition comes about in the moment of intuiting,
since the generation of categories is sub-personal and not available to introspection. Fourth, the
purpose of the IGS is to allow unthematized processing to feed information to consciousness.
Thus, it makes sense that the output is an intuition that is felt. Lastly, this output is interpreted in
light of background beliefs to result in the realization that you are looking at a van Gogh
painting.
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5

RELIABILITY (AND NECESSITY) OF EXPERIENCE-BASED INTUITIONS OF
IDENTIFICATION
With the structure of experience-dependent IGSs in mind, I now turn to Thesis 2: the

reliability of an experience-based intuition depends on the quality of the experiences that shape
the corresponding IGS. Based on Thesis 1, I argue that while the accuracy of token intuitions
varies, the mechanism which produces experience-based intuitions is generally reliable. I review
two lines of skeptical challenges and respond to them. I highlight the importance of
distinguishing the reliability of an intuition-generating system and the accuracy of token
intuitions that it produces from the stability of categories of objects we identify intuitively. I end
by suggesting that though experience-based intuitions of identification are fallible just like other
sources of justification, they may be necessary components of decision making.
Experience-dependent IGSs have the potential to generate remarkably accurate
identifications. But the capacity for having good intuitions does not guarantee that you will in
fact have them. Having a sufficiently large repertoire of varied and representative experiences is
vital in the generation of accurate intuitions. The more abundant and varied the exemplars, the
more sophisticated the corresponding IGS. Consider an art historian, a college freshman taking
an introductory course, and a person who has never seen a painting. The naïve person would be
hard-pressed to experience any intuition of the authorship of any painting, much less an accurate
one. As you become familiar with more artworks, the IGS starts spitting out intuitions when
prompted by viewing experiences, but these intuitions are only sometimes accurate. With
increased exposure to works across mediums and styles, provided that labeled information is
labeled correctly, the identification intuitions of the art historian become increasingly accurate,
owing to a much more robust IGS that has been shaped by many exemplars. Experience thus
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explains the heightened reliability of expert intuitions.18 Simply put, good experience is
necessary for good identification intuitions.
But is experience sufficient for producing intuitions that we can rely on? I now consider
two lines of challenges to the reliability of intuition as a source of justification. To begin,
reliability is usually defined in terms of the extent to which intuitions lead to accurate judgments.
That is, an art identification intuition is reliable insofar as it leads to the correct identification of a
painting, and a medical diagnostic intuition is reliable to the extent that the patient in question
has the illness with which she has been diagnosed. One line of skeptical challenge claims that
token intuitions can lead us astray if we rely on them to make decisions. Thus, intuitions in
general are claimed to be unreliable. A second line of objection claims that even if intuitions at
times lead to accurate judgments, they cannot be said to be reliable if they merely track
consensus instead of truth (Koriat 2008).
The first line of objection is often framed in terms of moral intuitions being inflexible in
comparison to conscious reasoning. For instance, Greene (2017) has insisted that even if
experience can improve intuitions generally, any token intuition would be inflexible at the time
of deployment. In response, it should first be noted that such objections conflate intuitions with
intuitive judgments. As mentioned earlier, intuitions motivate judgment but require
interpretation. When some skeptics examine token intuitive judgments that they deem to be
subpar, they should take care to locate the source of the faulty judgment. The problem may have
arisen on the way from intuition to intuitive judgment – one may have interpreted a good
intuition in light of false beliefs.
Further, while it is true that in the moment of intuiting, an intuition can only be as good
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It might be easy to point out a Seurat even in a room full of Impressionist works. But identifying a Raphael in a
room full of Renaissance paintings might prove to be a challenge to the average art enthusiast.
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as prior conditioning, other acceptable sources of justification are susceptible to similar
inflexibility. Nagel (2012, 2014) has argued that the existence of perceptual illusions does not
preclude vision from having justificatory power. Analogously, the possibility of illusions in
epistemic intuitions does not preclude epistemic intuitions from being generally trustworthy
indicators of what counts as knowledge, especially when said intuitions are prompted by
meticulously crafted scenarios. In general, it seems unfruitful to determine the reliability of a
broad class of psychological states on token instances. After all, even conscious reasoning is
fallible, not least when the information used to reason with is incorrect. Instead, it may be more
helpful to focus not on the quality of certain intuitions but rather on investigating the robustness
of intuition generating systems.19 Moreover, the influence of contextual or framing effects on
intuitive judgments may be more easily investigated in non-moral intuitions of identification.
Whereas experiments testing people’s moral intuitions are often susceptible to the criticism that
the designated “right” answer is in fact wrong on certain interpretations, experiments involving
non-moral intuitions of identification may be much less prone to such experimental design flaws.
My account might also help to address some concerns of inaccurate token intuitions
argued from interpersonal inconsistency (Goldman 2007). Conflicting intuitions across
individuals might be explained by appealing to differences in cognitive abilities, such as those
involving memory consolidation and retrieval, as well as the quality and depth of prior
experience.20 After accounting for the differences in experience, we may find that each person’s
intuition, though they conflict interpersonally, are well-justified. In short, inaccurate intuitive
judgments do not entail that intuitions are less reliable than other means of justification.
In response to the second challenge on the capacity for intuitions to track truth, I
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This is in line with what process reliabilism advocates (Goldman 2006).
I explore the implications of my account for social epistemology in my thesis.
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recognize that experience-based intuitions are rooted in personal categories rather than natural
kind categories.21 However, the general trend remains that with experience, an IGS forms
categories that are increasingly fine-grained and resistant to nuisance. Further, experience does
not merely come from idiosyncratic encounters. Some high-quality experience may come from
testimony from reliable persons, not to mention formal education. More importantly, while some
take consensus to be a lackluster measure of accuracy, many targets of investigation are artifacts
the definitions of which are moving targets. Such concepts as chairs, Impressionism, knowledge,
and moral salience may be best defined by consensus. When art authenticators exhaust means of
chemical analysis and provenance research, consensus among experts – all of whom may be
relying on intuition – may be the only way to determine the authorship of a newly discovered
painting. Sometimes consensus is all we could hope to track when truth is not easily defined.
Underlying my responses to both challenges to the reliability of intuitions is the
important distinction between the reliability intuition-generating systems (and the accuracy of
their resulting token intuitions) versus the stability of the environment in which we experience
intuitive judgments. Take moral intuitions as an example. While intuitive judgments may seem
unreliable for difficult moral cases, including edge cases for in which people do not generally
have adequate training, the cause of such unreliability is often the inherent instability or
inconsistency in morality itself rather than the unreliability of intuition generating systems.
Groups of people who are epistemic peers may stably arrive at similar moral intuitions given
their common experiences. But whether those intuitions lead to moral judgments that all moral
agents would deem to be accurate token intuitions is a separate issue. In other words, groups of
epistemic peers who share similar experiences in the moral realm may arrive at comparable
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Goldman (2007) construes the targets of philosophical analysis as concepts in the psychological and personal
senses (6), not as concepts tracking natural kinds.
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moral intuitions owing to the reliability of experience-based intuition generation systems, but the
accuracy of those moral intuitions are not always evaluated by their epistemic peers. Moreover,
according to Kahneman and Klein (2009), “skilled intuitions will only develop in an
environment of sufficient regularity which provides valid cues to the situation” (520). Morality
may be one such unstable environment, along with Kahneman and Klein’s example of the stock
market. In contrast, highly stable environments include chess, medicine, and art identification,
among others.
Lastly, I want to highlight the necessity of experience-based identification intuitions.
Some skeptics conclude that since intuitions are fallible due to various reasons, we ought not to
rely on them. However, they neglect to recognize that, setting aside the question of whether we
are justified in using such intuitions, we may not be able to avoid using them. Consider again the
popular contention that since moral intuitions are less flexible than conscious reasoning, we
should favor reasoning over intuition. It seems to me that this sort of claim makes the mistake of
unduly circumscribing intuitions to the realm of only some subsets of intuitions. Even
proponents of intuitions are susceptible to making this mistake. For instance, Nagel (2012)
suggests that reflective thinking is triggered in novel cases pertaining to the identification of
knowledge (500). However, the very recognition that a given case is unusual involves an
identification intuition that is experience-based. We don’t come to the realization that a scenario
is unusual by comparing it, feature by feature, to a “usual” case. We might not even be able to
articulate which features are relevant to defining a scenario as belonging to one kind versus
another. Instead, some things just strike us as unusual when we encounter them. This realization
of something as being different than expected at least involves discerning relevant features of the
case at hand that distinguishes it from other similar cases. Thus, even if we prefer to carefully
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reason through a novel case before making a judgment, we still rely on an identification intuition
rooted in experience to start the process.
Thus, it seems that good empirical experiences give people better intuitions across a wide
range of intuition categories that are experience-based. Some common challenges against the
reliability of intuitions do not successfully demonstrate that intuitions are in general less reliable,
or more dispensable, than other sources of justification.
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6

EXPERIENCE-BASED INTUITIONS IN THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS

I would like to devote the last section to a discussion of some implications of my account
of experience-based intuitions to debates in philosophical methodology, since the nature and
reliability of intuitions might contribute to greater understanding of the role of intuitions in
thought experiments. I suggest that the insofar as the mental states elicited by philosophical
thought experiments are intuitions, what we get from the case method is likely neither the
objective nature of the target of investigation nor a set of its necessary and sufficient qualifying
conditions. On the other hand, we might also be overstating the case if we conclude based on
discrepant case method judgments across individuals that philosophers ought not to appeal to
intuitions, whether their own or that of non-philosophers. I suggest that some intuitive judgments
elicited by thought experiments, insofar as they are prompted by the sort of experience-based
descriptive intuitions of identification I’ve thus described – and I argue that many thought
experimental intuitions are of this kind – tell us about the quality of experience we have in
domains relevant to the subject under investigation. Our intuitions, however divergent across
individuals, also have the potential to reveal conceptual commitments that are not directly
accessible.
6.1

Do some thought experiments elicit experience-based identification intuitions?
The goal of this section is to get to the nature of what is revealed by thought experiment

intuitions. But first it needs to be established that thought experiments in fact elicit experiencebased identification intuitions that of the same kind as intuitions we have in response in everyday
situations. I argue that not only do thought experiments elicit intuitions, such intuitions as a
whole are also not importantly distinct from intuitions we experience in everyday situations. I
also suggest that many thought experiments in philosophical literature seem to fall into the
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category of experience-based intuitions of identification which can be explained by the account I
have thus put forth.
To begin, there is a tradition of employing thought experiments as a means of
philosophizing. Many, including Edouard Machery (2017), use the term “method of cases” to
refer to the methodology that philosophers use when they present a real or imagined vignette and
then reason from his or her judgment of the relevant philosophical issue at hand from the
vignette. Machery writes, “cases are descriptions of actual or hypothetical situations, and
philosophical cases are cases put forward by philosophers” (11). Thus, I will use thought
experiments and the method of cases interchangeably. It’s also generally accepted that
philosophical thought experiments are “almost always meant to elicit a judgment or some other
mental state about the situations they describe” (Ibid.). Though Machery’s phrasing leaves room
for one to argue that thought experiments can elicit any number of mental states, including
intuitions, he later goes on to dismiss the need to describe the relevant mental state in the case
method as intuitions, citing a multitude of reasons, not least of which is a plethora of ways in
which the notion of intuition is cashed out (36).
Yet not only is it common to describe the method of cases as involving intuitions, it again
seems important here to reiterate the distinction between intuitions and judgments which are
prompted by intuitions.22 While it may be true that philosophers rely on explicit and explicable
judgments when making arguments – after all, the content of the judgment should be made clear
to the reader who is following along attempting to glean the point that is made by the use of the
thought experiment – it’s a separate question whether the mental state immediately elicited when
the thought experiment is considered amounts to a judgment. In other words, just because
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philosophers take the propositional attitude that amounts to a judgment which resulted from
considering a thought experiment to make their argumentation, it does not follow that an
intuition plays no role in the process. In fact, we have seen that intuitions appear to not only have
a distinctive phenomenology and are triggered in certain conditions but also play a role in
influencing judgment and action. The judgment that a certain mental state is or is not a justified
true belief in Gettier cases is informed by an intuition, even though the intuition itself, because it
lacks content, plays much less visible of a role in argumentation.
Further, not only are intuitions triggered by thought experiments, these intuitions are also
not distinct in kind from intuitions that we experience in everyday situations, such as the
intuition in the van Gogh case. Though there are differences we could draw between them, there
doesn’t seem to be good reasons for why those differences provide enough justification for
drawing a hard line between them. According to Machery, there are three ways in which the
mental states elicited by thought experiments can be characterized:
1. The exceptionalist posits that there is something importantly distinct from about
the intuitions elicited by philosophical thought experiments that sets these
intuitions apart from everyday intuitions in various ways (17). It might be posited
that thought experiment intuitions have distinct phenomenologies – e.g., a sense
of heightened necessity, as though your intuition must be right about the thought
experiment. They could also have a distinct epistemic role, for instance, in being a
priori justified. And they could have a distinct etiology, such as expressing one’s
conceptual competence.23
2. The particularist holds that the mental states prompted by thought experiments are
a particular type of everyday judgment (19). As such, they have certain properties
that some, but not all, of everyday judgments possess. For instance, some
particulartist characterizations may identify thought experiment intuitions by
means of their content, phenomenology, epistemic status, or etiology, while
maintaining that these properties are par for the course for intuitions in general.
3. The minimalist holds that philosophical thought experiments do not elicit attitudes
that are distinct in kind from those elicited by non-thought-experiment cases (20).
While thought experiment intuitions are often prompted by descriptions of
situations one should not count on encountering in real life (e.g., Swampman), the
attitudes themselves are of the same kind as everyday intuitions.
23

Though it is not clear to me what this is in opposition to.
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I take the minimalist approach, since thought experiments possess the same defining
features that other intuitions possess. They neither possess properties that distinguish them from
everyday judgments (except for their unusual subject matter) nor can they be identified with a
particular type of everyday judgment (20). Thought experiment intuitions, according to Machery,
do not possess a phenomenology that everyday intuitions do not have (e.g., they do not carry a
heightened sense of urgency), do not have distinctive epistemic status (e.g. they are not justified
a priori), do not have a distinctive semantic status (e.g., they are not analytic), they do not have a
distinctive etiology, and so on (20). Further, while one could make the argument that the subject
matter of thought experiment intuitions often being unusual could qualify them as a distinctive
sort of mental states, as Machery also notes, everyday judgments can also be about unusual
cases. He writes, “when we judged that the first iPhone was a phone, our judgment had a novel
subject matter, but it was of the same kind as other application of the concept PHONE.
Generally, everyday judgments can be made about esoteric subject matters” (21). I agree with
Machery on this point and contend that though experiment intuitions seem to play the same
epistemic role as other intuitions, even though they tend to be prompted more by imagined and
unusual input. Furthermore, thought experiments can indeed involve descriptions of actual rather
than hypothetical scenarios. In cases where the case is actual rather than hypothetical, it seems a
far reach to contend that just because a philosopher is describing the scenario that the resulting
mental state in the intuitor needs to be categorized differently.
There remains the question of whether some thought experiment intuitions fall under the
class of experience-based intuitions of identification. It seems to me that many philosophical
intuitions are indeed of this kind. For starters, I think that when we consider the goal of many
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thought experiments used in the areas of philosophy of language, epistemology, and action
theory, for instance, the aim of the cases is to draw out intuitions that help with classification.
Goldman (2007) has suggested that philosophes consider actual and hypothetical examples and
ask whether these examples provide instances of the target category or concept – e.g.,
knowledge, reference, causation, etc. (1). The mental responses that people have to these cases,
which he happily calls intuitions, are treated as evidence for category membership of the case.
Classification intuitions, according to Goldman, are intuitions about how cases are to be
classified, or whether various categories or concepts apply to selected cases (4). Indeed it seems
that thought experiments such as Gettier cases or Twin Earth are put forth with the explicit aim
of prompting identification intuitions that help us make judgments about what sort of concept is
represented in the case. As Goldman puts it, the “discovery” that knowledge isn’t equivalent to
justified true belief was made not through Edmund Gettier’s declaration about the category
membership of his examples, but rather by the agreement in the intuitive judgments that Gettier
and his readers shared about the examples. In other words, intuitions in response to many
philosophical thought experiments, specifically those intuitions that prompt us to make
judgments about what sort of concept we are dealing with.
Further, these identification intuitions seem to rely on experience in the sense that it
seems implausible that one could have intuitions about edge cases of what could be considered
knowledge if one does not have a good foundational grasp of more mundane cases of knowledge
might look like. It seems far-fetched to say that the concept of knowledge, for instance, has been
endowed through what I have called evolved systems. The concept of knowledge might not be
something that we need to acquire through formal learning, but it seems to require everyday
experience having to do with knowing things and forming implicit notions of what knowledge
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might constitute based on those experiences. Goldman posits that the process of generating
classification intuitions has more in common with memory retrieval than with purely intellectual
thought, the core of the a priori (20). I agree and take that the identification of personal category
membership in response to philosophical cases relies significantly on prior experience.
6.2

What can experience-based thought experiment intuitions reveal?
What, then, is gleaned through the identification intuitions we experience when we

consider philosophical thought experiments? Some might contend that through our intuitions, we
glean rational, a priori truths about the objective categories we are attempting to draw. Skeptics,
including Machery (2017), have argued that since there is such vast interpersonal variation in
case method intuitive judgments that our intuitions really are not revealing much about their
intended, philosophically relevant targets, but perhaps our own biases and prejudices. Some
skeptics might go further and suggest that as result of the various biasing effects correlated with
interpersonal variations in intuitive judgments, appeals to intuition as a philosophical
methodology is ill-advised in general.
On my account, intuitions in response to thought experiments are poised to convey a lot
of useful information. First, they reveal information about our experience in the relevant domains
pertaining to the subject matter in the thought experiment. Just as the accuracy of my van Gogh
intuition tells me about the quality and depth of my prior art-viewing experiences, so too does
my intuition leading to the identification of philosophical categories reveal experience with these
categories. This is especially apparent, for instance, when the case presented is meant to probe
intuitions about object category membership. Consider, for instance, being presented with a
description of an edge case of an object that might be used for sitting, and being asked to
consider whether that object might qualify as a chair. One’s prior experience and knowledge of
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chairs would be crucial in informing the intuition, even though the intuition is here prompted by
a description, perhaps coupled with an imagined object from the description, rather than by
viewing the actual object. Furthermore, the way in which we imagine this description of the
object used for sitting may itself be informed by prior experience. That is, the sorts of chairs I’ve
come across prior to reading the description of a hypothetical chair affects the object that I
imagine as I’m reading the description. In this way, the category-identifying intuitive judgment
that I get from the description is deeply intertwined with experience, and, upon reflection, has the
potential to reveal that experience and how that experience might have shaped the current
intuition in question. This also means that biases may also revealed, if we consider the sorts of
experiences and how our position in the world makes certain experiences possible and more
likely. Not to mention some philosophers have constructed thought experiments using highly
atypical cases for illustrative purposes. Consider Donald Davidson’s Swampman case. Rather
than genuinely testing the confines of personal identity, such a case may be designed foremost to
be illustrative and used to reveal the reader’s theoretical commitments. So Machery’s conclusion
is helpful as long as we don’t use it to discount thought experiment intuitions altogether.
Furthermore, thought experiment intuitions may help uncover the stability of a given
environment as well as the typicality of cases described in the thought experiment. In other
words, two factors predict the accuracy of token thought experiment intuitions. First, a thought
experiment is more likely to elicit accurate intuitions if the case described is typical. That is, if
intuitors can be realistically expected to have come across cases in the past that are comparable
to the case described in a thought experiment, then that thought experiment has the capacity to
elicit accurate intuitions by triggering a robustly trained IGS. Second, a thought experiment that
describes events which occur in more stable environments is likely to elicit more accurate
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intuitions than one that describes events which occur in highly unstable environments. For
instance, cases involving the identification of species of trees are much more likely to produce
reliable intuitive judgments than are cases involving the identification of moral action, owing to
higher consistency in the taxonomy of trees in comparison to right versus wrong action.
But can descriptive thought experiment intuitions provide any genuine new knowledge of
the external world, especially when it comes to category memberships that are not solely
determined subjectively? That is, granting that we can glean, piecemeal, the contours of our
psychological categories through considering edge cases in thought experiments, it still seems
important to ask the question of what, if anything, could be learned through the case method
about the external world. Michael Strevens (2019) has recently defended the case method and
argued that intuitive judgments about cases come from ordinary beliefs that we form inductively
through our interactions with the environment. Thus, according to Strevens, “fresh knowledge
about the ultimate basis of category membership” is within grasp through the case method (138).
While I’m skeptical of Strevens’ contention that intuitions can lead us to know the
objective structure of the world or natural kind membership, I think he’s right that since
categories are inductively derived – that is, representations of categories emerge as we
experience the world – thought experiment intuitions provide some data to work with for
unveiling concepts. This is an important task, since some of our conceptual commitments are
introspectively opaque. When first-person direct reports of our conceptual commitments, or the
content of our concepts – whether they correspond to natural kind categories or not – generating
intuitions by the method of cases helps to uncover our commitments and our positions in the
world which have afforded us certain sets of experiences rather than others.
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7

CONCLUSIONS

In this thesis, I discussed the nature of and mechanism underlying intuitions of
identification. I argued that many identification intuitions, such as the one that helps you identify
the authorship of a painting you are seeing for the first time, fall under the class of experiencebased intuitions. On my view, experience-based identification intuitions are produced by
domain-general learning systems of hierarchical abstraction that are capable of extracting
similarities and forming categories from experience. I suggested that deep convolutional neural
networks may be a promising model for understanding how such IGSs function.24 Owing to the
mechanism of experience-dependent IGSs, the reliability of experience-based intuition X
depends on the quality of the experiences that have shaped the IGS which produced X. I further
argued that not only are experience-based intuitions no more fallible than other sources of
justification, they may be indispensable. Lastly, even if intuitions turn out not to reveal a prior
truths or knowledge about natural kind categories when employed in philosophical inquiry, those
intuitions that rely on prior experience might be helpful in unveiling conceptual commitments.

24

One particularly intriguing implication of using artificial neural networks to explain how human beings come to
have certain intuitions is the possibility that such networks are themselves capable of having intuitions!
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